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TRAWLING FOR MEANING: A NEW STANDARD
FOR "BEST SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
AVAILABLE" IN THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS
FISHERIES CONSERVATION ACT
James William Merrill+
"He was an old man who fished alone in a skiff in the Gulf Stream and he
had gone eighty-four days now without taking a fish."' Every fisherman can
relate to the "salao"2 luck and lousy fishing endured by Santiago in
Hemingway's The Old Man and the Sea. Santiago's story is a reminder,
however, that no matter how bad the luck, a run of prosperity is close at hand.
The fishing industry has enjoyed a longstanding and romantic tradition in the
United States, 3 which continues today and is illustrated by the recent
popularity of the Discovery Channel television show Deadliest Catch.4
Despite this romantic view, decades of overfishing, missteps in
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1. ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE OLD MAN AND THE SEA 9 (1952).
2. Id. ("[Tlhe boy's parents had told him that [Santiago] was now definitely and finally
salao, which is the worst form of unlucky. . . .").
3. See PAUL MOLYNEAUX, THE DORYMAN'S REFLECTION: A FISHERMAN'S LIFE 13 n.l
(2005) ("[Following the American Revolution, [t]he new United States government valued the
fishing fleet, which provided a lookout off America's shores and trained potential sailors for the
navy. ... During World War I the U.S. Coast Guard equipped fishermen with VHF radios and
instructions on how to identify German U-boats."); see generally RUDYARD KIPLING, CAPTAINS
COURAGEOUS (1896) (telling the story of New England fishermen at the turn of the twentieth
century) (Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1964); HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 13-15 (W.W. Norton
& Co., Inc. 1967) (1851) (describing the serenity of water and the honor of boarding a fishing
boat as a "simple sailor").
4. Deadliest Catch (Discovery Channel) (capturing the story of a number of the fishermen
who endure the brutal Alaskan King and Opilio crab seasons); see also Charles McGrath,
Commercial Fishermen, Battling the Elements Between Commercials, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2008,
at Cl (discussing the popularity of the hit television show Deadliest Catch).
5. See RICHARD ELLIS, THE EMPTY OCEAN 12-13 (2003) (discussing the declining marine
life biomasses and fisheries due to overfishing).
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management,6 inequitable enforcement, and infighting between the federal
government and fishermen have created distrust between the government and
6. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing a sample of the management mistakes). Management of
New England fisheries, specifically the multi-species groundfishing and scallop fisheries, provide
prime examples of this general disagreement. See Richard Gaines, Reps Raise Red Flags on
Catch Shares: Conference Hears of Successes, and Dire Community Impacts, GLOUCESTER
TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, available at http://www.gloucestertimes.com/fishing/x546179417/Reps-
raise-red-flags-on-catch-shares. In the latest attempt to stabilize the fisheries, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)
introduced individual fishing quotas ("IFQs" or "catch shares") in various parts of the country.
Nick Walter, Catch Shares Welcomed by Most, BRADENTON HERALD, Sept. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.bradenton.com/2009/09/02/1679001 /catch-shares-welcomed-by-most.html
(discussing catch shares on commercial grouper and tilefish in the Gulf of Mexico); see also
NOAA Announces New Catch Share Program in Gulf of Mexico, NOAA (Aug. 31, 2009),
http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2009/2009083 I _tilefish.html. This measure turns the
regulated fisheries into commodities where the poundage allowed for each licensed fisherman
acts as a tradable commodity. See Gaines, supra.
Although many applaud the drastic change in fisheries policy, others-including many local
fishermen and some environmentalists-believe that the new regulations will do little more than
consolidate and privatize a once inclusive industry. Compare John Lee, Tumult in Region's
Fishing Industry: Federal Push to Manage Fisheries in Sectors Stirs Concern, PROVIDENCE Bus.
NEWS, Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://www.pbn.com/detail/44412.html?sub id-444
12#print-l (explaining the concerns of New England fishermen that the regulations will drive
small-boat operators out of the market), and Becky W. Evans, Fishermen to Enroll in Sectors
Tuesday, STANDARD-TIMES, Aug. 31, 2009, available at http://www.southcoast
today.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090831/NEWS/908310333 ("[S]ome fishermen fear that
sectors could result in an unfair distribution of fishing quotas and eventual consolidation of the
industry."), with Walter, supra ("The overwhelming majority of Florida fishermen are from the
recreational sector, so any regulations or quotas put on the commercial sector are typically
welcome from the recreational side."). This change in policy makes it imperative that the science
used in promulgating rules is correct and, as a result, brings to the forefront one of the problems
that has plagued fisheries management since the enactment of the Magnuson-Fisheries
Conservation Act in 1976. See Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1884 (2006)).
7. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., NAT'L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., FINAL REP. No. 01G019887, REVIEW OF NOAA FISHERIES
ENFORCEMENT PROGRAMS AND OPERATIONS 7, 10 (2010) (finding a disturbing trend of
inequitable penalties levied against violators of fisheries regulations, particularly violators in the
New England Fisheries management area, that led to a deterioration in relations between NMFS
and fishermen and caused a breakdown in the fisheries management).
8. See, e.g., Don't Let Groundfish Action Unravel Industry, COMMERCIAL FISHERIES
NEWS (Feb. 2009), http://www.fish-news.com/cfn/editorial/editorial 2 09/editorial_2_09.html.
Interestingly, the disagreement rests not on whether to conserve, but on what measures should be
taken to conserve the fisheries effectively while also maintaining the communities that are
economically dependent on the fisheries. See Russell Drumm, Fishermen Cry Foul: Industry
Worries about New Members of Council, EAST HAMPTON STAR, Aug. 6, 2009, available at
http://www.easthamptonstar.com/dnn/Home/News/FishermanCryFoul/tabid/9660/Default.aspx
("Now it's the commercial industry ... people who make their living on the water, versus the
environmental industry." (quoting Tony Dilernia, commercial fisherman, former Mid-Atlantic
Fishery Management Council delegate)); Richard Gaines, New Take on Past Fishing Science?,
GLOUCESTER TIMES, Aug. 24, 2009, available at http://www.gloucestertimes.com/fishing/xl89
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the fishermen that threatens the existence of the nation's fisheries and the
communities that rely on them.9  The central disagreement rests on the
seemingly simple task of determining how many fish are in the water.'0
Accurate estimates of fish stocks have proved evasive, making the
determinations highly contested by fishing communities and environmentalists
alike." As a result, doubt shrouds the scientific data regarding these fish
6342843/New-take-on-past-fishing-science/print (criticizing continued reliance on the debunked
fisheries impact study claiming that commercial fish stocks would be obliterated by 2048);
Christine Kearney, "Deadliest Catch" Seamen Say Fishermen not Greedy, REUTERS, July 28,
2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE56R66S20090728 ("When things go
wrong, the fishermen get blamed, but the truth is we are only fishing what [NMFS] tell[s] us we
can fish . . . ." (quoting boat captain Phil Harris, star of "Deadliest Catch")).
9. See DAVID DOBBS, THE GREAT GULF: FISHERMEN, SCIENTISTS, AND THE STRUGGLE
TO REVIVE THE WORLD'S GREATEST FISHERY 5 (2000) ("[T]he rift between fishermen and
NMFS scientists over how to look at the ocean and think about fish fostered a level of discord,
doubt, and mistrust that made it almost impossible to convince fishermen and regulators to curb
overfishing."); Josh Eagle, Domestic Fishery Management, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND
POLICY 275, 282 (Donald C. Bauer, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds. 2007); PETER
MANSO, PTOWN: ART, SEX, AND MONEY ON THE OUTER CAPE 212-13 (2002) ("The fishermen
as a political bloc are almost insignificant, . . . and [the government] will push them right into the
water. They'll treat them like trash... . Once they get fishing out of here, they'll never allow it
back in again." (alteration in original) (quoting George Bryant, Province town historian));
MOLYNEAUX, supra note 3, at 230 (explaining a commercial fisherman's disagreement with a
statement that scientists believed that there were an abundance of herring on Georges Bank);
CHARLES PELUSO & SANDY MACFARLANE, TIGGIE: THE LURE AND LORE OF COMMERCIAL
FISHING IN NEW ENGLAND 4 (2007) ("I had been on the job as shellfish biologist for 'only' six
years, and I had never fished commercially. Those two facts, plus being ... a college graduate,
meant I knew nothing, according to [the shellfisherman] Tiggie."); SUSAN R. PLAYFAIR,
VANISHING SPECIES: SAVING THE FISH, SACRIFICING THE FISHERMAN 100 (2003) ("[Some]
think[] the Department of Commerce is trying to circumvent the provisions of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act by making conditions so bad that fishermen leave the industry voluntarily."); Fishing
Council's Decks Are Stacked, NEWBURYPORT NEWS, Aug. 18, 2009, available at
http://www.newburyportnews.com/opinion/xl896343777/Fishing-councils-decks-are-
stacked?keyword=topstory (accusing the new head of NOAA of stacking regional councils with
"environmental activists").
10. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 3 ("[There exists] a squabble [between NMFS and
fishermen] that [takes] its most visible form in a disagreement, by orders of magnitude, over how
many fish were in [Georges Bank].").
I1. See MICHAEL L. WEBER, FROM ABUNDANCE TO SCARCITY: A HISTORY OF U.S.
MARINE FISHERIES POLICY 12 (2002). As one commentator has noted,
The fishermen and NMFS scientists of the New England fishery, our country's oldest,
most important, and most thoroughly studied, argued about the health of the cod and
haddock stocks of Georges Bank for over a decade until those stocks collapsed in 1992,
and ever since then they had been arguing about the cod population of the inner Gulf of
Maine ....
DOBBS, supra note 9, at 3; see also Susan Young, Fishermen Condemn Federal Regulations:
Lack of Trust Notable in Rockport Meeting, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Mar. 6, 2000, at BI
("[F]ishermen don't trust [NMFS]." (quoting Rob Wells, a marine insurance agent)); Beth Daley,
From Trawling to Trawigate: Controversial Fishing Research Vessel Ends 45-Year Run, GREEN
BLOG (Nov. 25, 2008, 1:59 PM), http://www.boston.com/lifestyle/green/greenblog/
2008/11/from trawling to trawlgate con 1.html ("Fishermen and scientists are trying to
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stocks, as well as the fishery management plans that are based on this data.
Collaboration between scientists and fishermen is essential for successful
fisheries management.' 2 Each side possesses unique experience 3 and has the
desire to ensure a future for the nation's fisheries.14 Collaboration, however,
has been replaced by quarrel when determining the nation's fishery
management schemes. The distrust by fishermen stems in part from a belief
that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)'s scientific conclusions are
based on faulty data collection.' 5  The fishermen believe that the federal
government desires to consolidate the fishing industry, thereby pushing the
everyday fisherman out of business.16 Scientists distrust fishermen because
they believe that fishermen have an incentive to exploit the resource as quickly
collaborate more. But there remains a deep mistrust between the two groups on a public resource
that pays for so many individual paychecks.").
12. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing the unprecedented "comprehensive
knowledge" that was gained when scientists and fishermen came together to explore the Gulf of
Maine).
13. See id., at 4-5. As Dobbs noted,
NMFS, dropping its sampling nets all over the Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank twice
yearly, has a better view of the big picture than most fishermen do, while the fishermen,
out on the ocean every day, know any given piece of water in far more detail and under
many more conditions and circumstances.
Id.; see also Zeke Grader & Natasha Benjamin, The Essential Collaboration: Protecting Stocks
and Our Industry Means Greater Cooperation Between Fishermen and Scientists, PAC. COAST
FED'N OF FISHERMEN'S ASS'NS (Jan. 2001), http://www.pcffa.org/fn-janOl.htm ("One of the
ways to effect cost savings in fishery research is to utilize fishermen, individuals who are
constantly on the water and know the fishing grounds."). Fishermen have a historical advantage
because their experiences and insights go back farther than most of the data that is currently being
used in scientific research, but scientists have a biological background, and through sample tows
have developed a solid understanding of the general lay of the fisheries, which is essential in
determining the proper conservation methods. Dobbs explained,
Fishermen had been working the Gulf [of Maine] for four centuries when Bigelow [an
oceanographer] declared it unexamined, and the best of them knew the water intimately
and in detail. . . . Unlike scientists, the fishermen did not quantify and categorize this
information into any sort of shareable database. They added it a drop at a time to pools
of knowledge ....
DOBBS, supra note 9, at 13-14.
14. Although it may seem counterintuitive that fishermen desire to conserve the fisheries,
the majority of fishermen are multi-generational fishermen who want to see the fisheries
sustained so that they can continue to make a living in the near future and, more importantly, so
that their children and grandchildren will have the choice to continue the fishing tradition.
PLAYFAIR, supra note 9, at 92 ("[T]here [are fishermen] who are willing to make a living and
[fishermen] who want to make a killing. . . . Unfortunately, . . . [t]oo many people view the
fishing industry as a group of people who want to make a killing.").
15. Id. at 221-22 ("[T]he science being used [by NMFS] is 'just too light on data points."'
(quoting fisherman Frank Mirarchi)).
16. Id. at 94 ("Many fishermen suspect that some members of the U.S. Congress want to get
rid of the fishing industry as it exists today.").
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as possible and will overstate the biomasses in order to obtain higher quotas,
creating a "tragedy of the commons."] 8
Over the past decade and a half, many of the legal battles among
environmentalists, NMFS, and fishermen have focused on the use of scientific
data in promulgating regulations. The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Conservation Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) requires that NMFS use the "best
scientific information available" (also known as "National Standard 2" or "best
available science") when crafting fishery regulations.19 NMFS interprets this
provision, correctly, to allow plans to be created with incomplete research,20
and courts, not as correctly, have held that NMFS need only rely on data and
research that is immediately at hand when creating a plan.21
This Comment focuses primarily on the interpretation of National Standard
2 and argues that it implicitly requires NMFS to use the best available research
methods when developing the scientific conclusions used to create fishery
management plans. The courts, by failing to interpret National Standard 2 to
include this requirement, effectively cripple challenges to the scientific method
employed by the government when obtaining data for fishery management
17. See Will Walsh, Fishy Business, 59 ALA. L. REv. 1661, 1663 (2008) (explaining that
fishermen often exceed quotas and attempt to catch as many fish as fast as possible). One need
look no farther than the exchange in Jaws between the shark fisherman Captain Quint and Woods
Hole scientist Matt Hooper to understand the current relationship between fishermen and
scientists:
Quint: You have city hands, Mr. Hooper, you been countin' money all your life.
Hooper: Alright, alright ... I don't need this working-class-hero crap.
JAWS (Universal Pictures 1975); see also PELUSO & MACFARLANE, supra note 9, at 3-4
(highlighting fishermen's general distrust of marine science and scientists).
18. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). A tragedy of
the commons occurs when
[e]ach man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without
limit-in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush,
each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.
Id.
19. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) (2006). The Magnuson-Stevens Act was originally enacted in
1976. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1884 (2006)). Subsequently, the Act has been
revised twice, first by the Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, and then by the Magnuson-Stevens
Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006. Sustainable Fisheries Act,
Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559; Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Reauthorization Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007). Any mention of the
"Magnuson-Stevens Act" refers to the three enactments as a whole unless otherwise noted.
20. 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b) (2009).
21. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd,170 F.3d
23 (1st Cir. 1999). Courts have refused to look at a best available science claim unless the
plaintiff produces better alternative science; in such a case, the court will defer to the judgment of
the agency unless the plaintiff shows that the agency's use of science, in light of the alternative
science presented, was arbitrary or capricious. Id. at 78.
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plans. This incubates the festering distrust between fishing communities and
NMFS and frustrates congressional intent.
Part I of this Comment sets the historical background for the current state of
federal fisheries management by focusing on the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries
Conservation Act and its two major revisions. This Comment then describes
the origins of the best available science standard and highlights the litigation
that has revolved around National Standard 2. Part 11 of this Comment
identifies issues that have arisen from continued deference by the courts
broadly defining "best available science." It then develops a proper
interpretation of National Standard 2. Finally, Part III acknowledges certain
measures that NMFS has taken to clarify the best available science standard
and suggests areas in which improvements can be made, including a new
regulatory definition and a regulatory solution.
I. How WE GOT HERE: THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD THAT IS FEDERAL
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Believing that ocean resources were inexhaustible, nations initially declined
to restrict foreign fishermen from taking resources, leading to the "freedom of
the seas" doctrine, which called for little or no restrictions on the taking of
seafood from the oceans. 22 Georges Bank and the Grand Bank are very fertile
fishing grounds and were valuable locations for the salted fish industries of
France, Spain, and England dating back to the sixteenth century. 23 By the late-
nineteenth century, however, fisheries showed signs of exhaustion, and nations
24
became more protective of their fishing resources. Over the past century,
foreign fishing has remained an issue for countries attempting to protect their
respective resources. 25
International treaty negotiations over fisheries resources have long been a
point of contention. The United States initially resisted the idea of restricted
fisheries, but during the early 1900s, the federal government negotiated several
treaties to manage sensitive fisheries in a uniform multilateral manner.27
A. Congress Takes Action: Regulation Begins
Congress became involved in fishery management in 1872
when, in an effort to appease feuding New England trappers and long
22. WEBER, supra note I1, at 59. For centuries, fishing areas like Georges Bank in the
northwestern Atlantic validated this belief in inexhaustible resources. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id at 59-69.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 64-69.
27. Id. at 59-61.
28. A trapper is a fisherman who uses traps composed of wooden slates or wire mesh to
catch fish. RICHARD ADAMS CAREY, AGAINST THE TIDE: THE FATE OF THE NEW ENGLAND
FISHERMAN 21-22 (First Mariner Books 2000) (1999).
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liners29-a feud fueled by a "lack of knowledge about fish off New
England" 30-Congress created the United States Fish and Fishery
Commission.31 The Commission was created to identify underutilized
fisheries that could benefit fishing communities. 32
By the middle of the twentieth century, the waters surrounding the United
States began to show signs of severe depletion.33 International treaties proved
ineffective, and the federal government left regulation to the costal states, each
of which, in general, had jurisdictional power only over the waters within three
nautical miles of its shores.34 This made the states incapable of protecting the
United States' most fertile fishing grounds-which are located more than three
miles from shore-from both foreign factory fishing fleets and domestic
fishing fleets.3 5
29. A long liner is a fisherman who uses a type of fishing gear referred to as a long line. Id.
at 368. Generally, it is a length of line that is hundreds of yards long with hooks attached every
four to five feet. Id. Each hook is baited and set and after a time, hauled back in order to harvest
its catch. Id Long liners were fed up with fish traps and accused the trappers of "robbing [long
liners] of their catch and threatening their future." WEBER, supra note I1, at 3. The
Massachusetts legislature refused to become involved in the feud, but the Rhode Island legislature
considered banning the use of fish traps off of its coast. Id Using this controversy as a platform,
an enterprising Smithsonian scientist, Spencer Fullerton Baird, convinced the federal government
to commit to "investigating marine life off New England." Id
30. WEBER, supra note 11, at 3.
31. Id. Baird, the first Commissioner and sole member of the Commission, was so adamant
that the Commission be free of political influence that he insisted that the position be unpaid. Id.
at 4. Congress created Commission in order to determine "whether any . . . diminution in the
number of the foodfishes of the coast and the lakes of the United States ha[d] taken place; and, if
so, to what causes the same [wa]s due; and also whether any and what protective, prohibitory, or
precautionary measures should [have] be[en] adopted." Id (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess. 683 (1871)). Congress believed that this process would take, at most, a few years;
therefore, many resources, such as office space, were not provided, and Baird worked out of his
home. Id It soon became clear, however, that the task was far loftier than had been previously
thought. Id at 4-5. Baird used a combination of federal and private funds to construct
permanent scientific research centers, the first in Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in 1885. Id. at 6.
Over the nearly seventy-year period of its existence, the Commission was responsible for some of
the greatest advancements in marine biological understanding in modem history. See id. at 5-7.
32. Id. at 4. Until Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976,
the federal government played only a small role in fishery regulation. Id. at 153. The
Commission served only to advance scientific understanding and offer advice on the most
effective way to harvest the resources. Id. at 4, 153.
33. See Paul R. Bagley, Note, Don't Forget About the Fishermen: In the Battle over
Fisheries Conservation and Management a Conservation Ethic Has Trumped Economic
Concerns of the Community-or Has It?, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 765, 768 (2003). Although the
industrial revolution came late to the fishing industry, by the mid 1960s, Japanese and Russian
fish processing ships were traversing the globe. MANSO, supra note 9, at 159. These ships had
the ability not only to catch fish, but also to clean and package the seafood, allowing for
incredibly long storage times. CAREY, supra note 28, at 41-42.
34. WEBER, supra note I1, at 65.
35. Id The foreign fishing fleet was worrisome from a national-security standpoint as well.
Id at 64. As the Cold War arguably reached its hottest point in the early 1960s, "61 Russian
Catholic University Law Review
In response to declining fish stocks, the United States enacted the Bartlett
Act in 1966.36 The Act created a twelve-mile exclusive fishing zone for
United States vessels. 37 This twelve-mile limit proved ineffective, however, as
many of the country's fertile fishing grounds lay beyond that limit.38
Until the enactment of the Fishery Conservation and Management Act in
1976, the only real restrictions placed on foreign fleets fishing off the coast of
the eastern U.S., aside from the Bartlett Act's twelve-mile limit, came from the
International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. 39 This treaty,
not surprisingly, proved ineffective because of "the difficulty of achieving
agreement on meaningful conservation measures among nations with different
views, conflicting goals of development and conservation, risk-prone decision
making, fishing by nonmembers, resistance to effective enforcement, the
failure to support or act on scientific analysis, inadequate funding, and the lack
of effective monitoring programs."4 0 While these international efforts to create
uniform fishery regulations failed to coalesce,41 in 1976, Congress enacted
unparalleled legislation that radically and permanently altered the management
process of for U.S. fisheries.4 2
1. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976
The Fishery Conservation and Management Act created a federal fisheries
conservation zone between three and two hundred nautical miles off the coast
of the United States.43 The main purpose of the legislation was to protect and
trawlers on Nantucket Shoals off Massachusetts sent shockwaves through New England's
struggling fishing communities." Id. The Soviet factory trawlers could go anywhere in the
world, and the U.S. domestic fleet, built mostly before World War II, paled in comparison to the
state-of-the-art Soviet ships. Id. Soon after, U.S. haddock catches sank from the 62,000 metric-
ton average between 1950 and 1966 to a historic low of 3731 metric tons in 1974. Id. Soviet
ships, by comparison, landed 128,800 metric tons in 1965 (more than double the average U.S.
catch) and 23,240 metric tons in 1974 (over five times more than U.S. catches). Id.
36. Bartlett Act, Pub. L. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908 (1966) (repealed 1976).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., George Carroll Curtis, The Fishing Banks off Our Atlantic Coast, 45 BULL.
AM. GEO. Soc'Y 413, 413-14 (1913).
39. WEBER, supra note I1, at 64-65, 70.
40. Id at 61.
41. See id. at 64-66.
42. See Eagle, supra note 9, at 276.
43. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, § 101, 90 Stat.
331, 336 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006)). The governing statute, which has
come to be known simply as the "two-hundred mile limit," states:
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States to be
known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery
conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the
coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a manner
that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the territorial
sea is measured.
482 [Vol. 60:475
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promote U.S. commercial fishing resources from international exploitation.4
The Act granted the Secretary of Commerce regulatory power over fisheries in
the waters between three and two hundred miles from shore.45 The findings of
the Act were clear.46  First, Congress found that fisheries serve an essential
function to the nation's "food supply, economy, and health.' 7  Second,
Congress found that certain fish stocks had been overfished to dangerously low
levels, and international fishing regulations had failed to alleviate the
problem." Finally, Congress asserted that "[t]he collection of reliable data is
essential to the effective conservation, management, and scientific
understanding of the fishery resources of the United States."49
Id In 1986, 16 U.S.C. § 1811 was amended to incorporate Proclamation Number 5030, which
established an "exclusive economic zone" of two hundred nautical miles around the United
States, but the amendment had no practical effect on the protected fishery area. Act of Nov. 14,
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-659, § 101(a)(6), 100 Stat. 3706, 3706; Exclusive Economic Zone of the
United States, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (Mar. 14, 1983) ("This Proclamation does not change existing
United States policies concerning ... fisheries."); see Bagley, supra note 33, at 768.
44. 16 U.S.C § 180 1(b)(3) ("It is therefore declared to be the purposes of the Congress in
this [Act] ... to promote domestic commercial and recreational fishing under sound conservation
and management principles, including the promotion of catch and release programs in
recreational fishing . . . .").
45. See Id § 1802(39) ("The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Commerce or his
designee."); id. § 1803 (providing appropriations to the Secretary to carry out the provisions of
the Act); id § 1811(a) ("[T]he United States claims, and will exercise in the manner provided for
in this [Act], sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all fish, and all
Continental Shelf fishery resources, within the exclusive economic zone."). The Secretary of
Commerce delegated the administration of this Act to the newly created NMFS. See About
National Marine Fisheries Service, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN.,
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aboutus.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
46. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (describing the findings of Congress's investigation and the
need for legislation).
47. Id. § 1801(a)(1), (3) (acknowledging that the nation's fisheries provide "recreational
opportunities"). It is important to note that although commercial fishing gains the bulk of the
attention in fishery management and overutilization, recreational fishing, particularly in certain
fisheries, accounts for as many, if not more, of the annual takings than those accumulated by
commercial fishermen. See GulfofMexico Greater Amberjack Fishery 2010 Recreational Quota
Closure: Frequently Asked Questions, NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (June 2010),
http://sero.nmfs.noaa.gov/sflpdfs/Greater _AJ FAQS June 2010.pdf (explaining the need for
both recreational and commercial quotas to regulate overfishing, and showing that in 2010, the
greater amberjack quota was two times higher for recreational fishing than for commercial
fishing).
48. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(2) ("Certain stocks of fish have declined to the point where their
survival is threatened."); id. § 1801(a)(4) ("International fishery agreements have not been
effective in preventing or terminating the overfishing of these valuable fishery resources.").
49. Id § 1801(a)(8). Congress also found that (1) "[fjishery resources are finite but
renewable," id § 1801(a)(5); (2) "[a] national program for the conservation and management of
the fishery resources of the United States is necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild
overfished stocks, to insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of essential fish
habitats, and to realize the full potential of the Nation's fishery resources," id § 1801(a)(6); and
(3) "[i]nternational cooperation is necessary to address illegal, unreported, and unregulated
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The purposes of the Act were equally straightforward. Congress intended
"to take immediate action to conserve and manage the fishery resources found
off the coasts of the United States, 50 by promoting "domestic commercial and
recreational fishing under sound conservation and management principles" 51
while implementing, "in accordance with national standards, . . . fishery
management plans which will achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the
optimum yield from each fishery." 52
Regional councils were created and charged with regulating the
fisheries through fishery management plans. After a regional council
creates a fishery management plan, it is sent to NMFS for approval.54
The Magnuson-Stevens Act requires NMFS to review the plans to
determine whether they meet the national standards55  prescribed by
fishing and other fishing practices which may harm the sustainability of living marine resources
and disadvantage the United States fishing industry." Id § 1801(a)(12).
50. Id § 1801(b)(1).
51. Id § 1801(b)(3).
52. Id § 1801(b)(4). Initially, the Magnuson-Stevens Act did a lot of good for both the
fisheries and fishing communities. Bagley, supra note 33, at 768. Within ten years, the
unauthorized foreign fishing presence had been all but eliminated within the two-hundred-mile
limit, allowing American fishermen to regain their fishing grounds. Id However, problems
began anew when the tax credits and low interest loans that had been provided to fishermen in
tandem with the Magnuson-Stevens Act led to an influx of participants in the industry. Id. at
768-69; see NAT'L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FED. FISHERIES,
INVESTMENT TASK FORCE REPORT TO CONGRESS 27-44 (1999), available at
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/ITF.html (discussing the potential effects that subsidies can have
on the fishing industry). The economic incentives were designed to encourage the development
of the U.S. fishing industry. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(6) ("It is . . . the purpose[] of the
Congress . . . to encourage the development by the United States fishing industry of fisheries
which are currently underutilized or not utilized by United States fishermen."). The influx of
funds and bigger fishing companies led to fishing vessel and equipment innovation, and soon the
U.S. fleet was as destructive and efficient as the foreign fleets that had been cast out. Bagley,
supra note 33, at 768-69. Giant groundfishing nets entered the industry and allowed fishermen to
fish in areas that had been too risky to fish previously. PLAYFAIR, supra note 9, at 95. Some of
this equipment increased the catch efficiency of each vessel, but it also led to the destruction of
bottom structures used by fish as habitats and spawning grounds. Id The regional councils were
slow to respond to environmental concerns regarding the use of this new equipment. Id.
53. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1852-1853 (detailing the duties of the regional councils and the
requirements for fishery management plans).
54. Id. § 1854(a)(1)(A) ("Upon transmittal by the Council to the Secretary of a fishery
management plan or plan amendment, the Secretary shall . . . immediately commence a review of
the plan or amendment to determine whether it is consistent with the national
standards . . .and any other applicable law . . . .").
55. National Standard I mandates that a fishery management plan must prevent overfishing
while allowing the optimum yield to be taken for the benefit of fishing communities. Id. §
1851 (a)(1 ) ("Conservation and management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving,
on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States fishing
industry."). National Standard 2, the focus of this Comment, mandates that the "[c]onservation
and management measures shall be based on the best scientific information available." Id. §
185 1(a)(2). National Standard 3 mandates that fish stocks and similar fish species be managed as
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56Congress. Although conservation was a factor in the 1976 Act, Congress
was more concerned with the effect of foreign fishing practices on local fishing
communities.
2. The 1996 Amendment's Focus on Conservation
In 1996, Congress enacted the Sustainable Fisheries Act that sought, among
other things, to clarify and balance the National Standards used when creating
fishery management plans. Congress also charged:
Upon determining that a fishery is overfished, the NMFS must
immediately notify the appropriate council and request the
implementation of conservation and management measures to
rebuild affected fish stocks. Once notified, the council then has one
year to prepare [a fishery management plan] to prevent overfishing.
completely and broadly as is practicable, id § 185 1(a)(3), and National Standard 4 requires that
fishery management plans not "discriminate between residents of different [s]tates" unless
absolutely necessary. Id § 1851(a)(4). If it is necessary to limit the fishery, the plan must
promote conservation, be "fair and equitable" among fishermen, and be implemented so that no
one person or entity receives an excessive share of fishing rights. Id. National Standard 5
requires that a council, "where practicable, consider efficiency in the utilization of fishery
resources" when instituting conservation plans. Id. § 1851(a)(5). National Standard 6 requires
that each plan be tailored to the specific fishery and take into account a variety factors, which
allows regional councils to restrict fisheries inconsistently from one region to the next, if
necessary. Id § 1851(a)(6). National Standard 7 mandates that fishery management plans,
"where practicable, minimize costs and avoid unnecessary duplication." Id. § 185 1(a)(7).
The 1996 amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Act added three standards to be considered
during the creation of a fishery management plan. Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-297, § 106(d), I10 Stat. 3559, 3570. The first of these, National Standard 8, mandates that
plans comply with the conservation goals set forth in the Act and "take into account the
importance of fishery resources to fishing communities." 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(8). National
Standard 9 requires plans, if practicable, to avoid bycatch and, when unavoidable, to limit the
mortality of bycatch. Id. § 1851(a)(9). "Bycatch" refers to fish caught in addition to the targeted
species, including species that are not the intended catch and members of the targeted species that
are ineligible for reasons such as size or sex. Id. § 1802(2). Finally, National Standard 10
requires that each plan take into account the "safety of human life at sea." Id. § 1851(a)(10).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a)(1).
57. Bagley, supra note 33, at 768. Skepticism and distrust of the Act existed in fishing
communities from the beginning, and the only senator from New England to vote for the Act was
Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA). Richard Gaines, News Analysis: 'With Fisheries, the First
Number You'd Dial Was Kennedy's': Champion's Loss Could Hurt Industry as It Moves to Catch
Shares, GLOUCESTER TIMES, Aug. 28, 2009, available at http://www.gloucestertimes.com/
fishing/x46885098/News-analysis-With-fisheries-the-first-number-youd-dial-was-Kennedys.
58. S. REP. No. 104-276, at 13 (1996). The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation observed,
Section 107(a) would amend national standard five to require conservation and
management measures, where practicable, to "consider" efficiency, rather than
"promote" efficiency.... The goal of this amendment is not to eliminate efficiency as a
consideration in the development of plans and regulations, but rather to ensure that it is
balanced with the requirements of other national standards.
Id.
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The crux of the [plan] is to develop measures that allow the fishery
to produce the maximum sustainable yield . . . on a continuous
basis.59
The Act also required the plan to restore the overfished resource within ten
years of its identification. 60 The ten National Standards are meant to guide
each regional council in balancing conservation and the social and economic
effects that each regulation has on fishing communities.61
Eleven years later, in 2007, Congress reauthorized the Magnuson-Stevens
Act.62 The reauthorization did not amend the National Standards, but Congress
63
expressly authorized and encouraged the use of limited-access fishery plans.
The Act now requires annual catch limits for all managed fisheries.64 In
addition, the Act attempted to improve the science used in decisions by
creating both a peer-review process and a stronger role for the Science and
Statistical Committees of the regional councils. 65
59. Bagley, supra note 33, at 770.
60. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(4)(A)(ii). The ten-year requirement is currently a particular point
of contention in Congress. See Press Release, U.S. Congressman Barney Frank, Frank and
Snowe Call on NOAA to Re-examine Timeline for Rebuilding Fish Stocks (Feb. 17, 2010),
available at http://www.house.gov/frank/pressreleases/2010/02-17-10-lubchenko-letter-
rebuilding-fish-stocks.html. A contingent led by Representative Barney Frank (D-MA) has urged
that there is no reason to place a ten-year requirement on the rebuilding stocks because it imposes
unreasonable and substantial economic burdens on local fishing communities. Id; see also
Flexibility in Rebuilding American Fisheries Act of 2009, H.R. 1584. 111th Cong. (2009) (stating
that the purpose of the bill was "[t]o amend the [Act] to extend the authorized time period for
rebuilding of certain overfished fisheries").
61. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(14).
62. Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-479, 120 Stat. 3575 (2007).
63. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(a) (2006) ("[A] Council may submit, and the Secretary may approve,
for a fishery that is managed under a limited access system, a limited access privilege program to
harvest fish if the program meets the requirements of this section."). Just before Congress passed
the 2007 Act was passed, a scientific study by Boris Worm claimed that, at the then-current
harvesting rates, the oceans would become a barren wasteland by 2048. See Boris Worm et al.,
Impacts of Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 Sci. 787, 790 (2006). The
urgency that such a study created could have spurred the passage of the 2007 Act. Worm has
since revised his prediction drastically and has concluded that the future of the world's oceans is
promising. Boris Worm et al., Rebuilding Global Fisheries, 325 SCI. 578, 584 (2009).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(15) ("[F]ishery management plan[s] . . . shall . . . establish a
mechanism for specifying annual catch limits in the plan (including a multiyear plan),
implementing regulations, or annual specifications, at a level such that overfishing does not occur
in the fishery, including measures to ensure accountability.").
65. Id § 1852(g)(1)(A).
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B. The Origins and Uses of the "Best Available Science" Standard
Congress first enacted a "best available science" standard in the Marine
of 66Mammal Protection Act of 1972. The provision allows the Secretary of
Commerce, after consulting the Marine Mammal Commission, to lift the
general moratorium on "takings" of marine mammals when warranted by the
best available scientific information. Congress also used a "best available
science" provision a year later in the Endangered Species Act of 1973.68
In 1976, Congress employed "best available science" terminology in the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.69 Leading up to enactment, there was discussion in
Congress as to the meaning of the "best available science" provision. 70 A
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation report described
National Standard 2 as "an important adjunct of National Standard 1" and
stated that fishery management plans should allow for harvest of the maximum
sustainable yield. ' National Standard 2 also served as a protective measure,
allowing NMFS to adjust its regulations as new and more accurate scientific
research became available.72 The Committee, however, did not intend
National Standard 2 to allow NMFS to impede research unreasonably:
[A] basic management objective is to harvest a stock of fish at the
level of optimum utilization. If little is known about the size of the
stock or environmental effects on other stocks or similar
relationships, however, even the best management scheme will fail.
The Committee interpreted the best available science standard to compel
NMFS to seek better scientific data when creating fishery management plans.74
In 2004, NMFS commissioned an independent study to report on its use of
National Standard 2. The Committee on Defining Best Scientific
Information Available for Fisheries Management (Committee on Best Science)
concluded that "[tihe practical consequence of the congressional intent in using
the phrase 'achieve the best available scientific information' is that
[NMFS] . . . ha[s] the responsibility to improve scientific information fbr
66. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, § 101(a)(3)(A), 86 Stat.
1027, 1030; COMM. ON DEFINING THE BEST SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE FOR
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE USE OF THE "BEST
SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION AVAILABLE" STANDARD IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT 17 (2004)
[hereinafter COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE].
67. COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note 66.
68. See id.
69. 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) ("Conservation and management measures shall be based upon
the best scientific information available.").
70. COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note 66, at 18.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. S. REP. No. 94-416, at 30 (1975).
74. See COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note 66, at 19.
75. Id. at vii-viii.
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decisions in future years."76 The Committee on Best Science also observed
that although the science centers that conduct the majority of the research for
regional councils can have an incentive to put forth the best available science,
the councils often have a greater incentive to ignore the science when it does
not support a particular agenda that is being promoted.n These inconsistent
goals result in muddled explanations of science, confusion, and distrust,
prompting court challenges of council determinations by environmentalists and
fishermen alike.78
The Committee on Best Science found that within the Magnuson-Stevens
Act, National Standard 2 impliedly obligates NMFS "to improve scientific
information and reduce uncertainty over time,"79 but that "decisions regarding
management and conservation should be made in a timely and effective
fashion with available information despite recognized information gaps."80
Although the Committee on Best Science expressed trepidation with the non-
uniform application of National Standard 2 between regional councils, it
cautioned against instituting a best available science statutory definition
because of the ever-changing nature of scientific information-gathering." The
Committee recommended that guidelines be promulgated to allow for a
uniform application of National Standard 2.82
The Committee on Best Science's recommendations were practical. Its goal
was to set guidelines that would "promote consistency in both the production
and the use of scientific information without unduly constraining the ability of
scientists to adopt new scientific protocols for data collection and analysis."83
The guidelines consisted of six criteria: relevance,84 inclusiveness, 85
76. Id at 19 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 33.
78. Id For an example of this disconnect, see CAREY, supra note 28, at 14 (describing one
fisherman's negative reaction to a scientist's report using technical formulas to explain the effect
of trap reductions).
79. COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note 66, at 52. The Committee on Best Science also
found that "[a] better structure to conduct science in [NMFS] would improve outsiders'
perceptions of [NMFS] scientists and science. A structure that allowed scientists to operate
objectively and independently of the management body (but was responsive to requests for
scientific investigations) could improve both the image and the performance of [NMFS]." Id.
(citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND ITS ROLE IN THE NATIONAL MARINE
FISHERIES SERVICE 4-5(2002)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 53-54. The Committee on Best Science also concluded that a legislative solution
would do little to alleviate the glut of litigation over the standard. Id. at 54.
82. Id. at 54.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 55. The relevance criterion requires that the data "be representative of the fish
stock being managed." Id.
85. Id. The inclusiveness criterion requires the inclusion of many scientists from an array of
relevant scientific disciplines. Id.
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objectivity," transparency and openness, timeliness, and peer review.89
These basic and widely accepted tenets would help, in the Committee's
opinion, ensure that the science used in creating fishery management plans is
sound and current.90 Another important recommendation that the Committee
on Best Science made was that "[t]he presentation of scientific information at
regional fishery management council meetings should be concise and as free of
scientific jargon as possible." 91 This would allow for council members and
stakeholders (e.g. fishermen) to understand the science better, thereby giving
the council a better opportunity to make sound decisions.92
Recognizing the deficiencies in the current use of National Standard 2, on
December 11, 2009, NMFS proposed amended guidelines that would govern
the National Standard in light of the National Research Council's 2004
report.93 In the notice, NMFS proposed to accept the six tenets recommended
by the Council to aid with uniform application of National Standard 2 by
regional councils and laid out an extensive process for peer review of agency
science.94
C. The Government and Fishermen Bump Heads: Judicial Review ofNMFS
Fishery Management Plans
1. Diagramming the Chevron Two-Step When Challenging an Agency's
Statutory Interpretation
When a court reviews an agency interpretation of a statute, the court affords
the agency deference in its interpretation.95 Courts show particular deference
when the decision is of a highly scientific or technical nature.9 6 Since the mid-
1980s, courts have employed the two-step analysis developed by Justice John
86. Id. The objectivity criterion emphasizes that "[d]ata collection and analysis should be
unbiased and obtained from credible sources." Id. at 56.
87. Id. at 55. The transparency-and-openness criterion seeks not only to inform the general
public about new developments, but also to require decision-makers to be forthright, clear, and
honest about the policies that they adopt. Id. at 56.
88. Id at 55. The timeliness criterion has prongs: (1) sufficient time must exist between
data collection and data application to ensure competent decision-making, and (2) data must be
relevant to the current situation. Id at 56-57.
89. Id at 55. The peer-review criterion suggests that NMFS must "establish an explicit and
standardized peer review process for all documents that contain scientific information used in the
development of [fishery management plans]. Id at 57.
90. Id. at 55.
91. Id. at 60. Scientific information often is presented in an uclear manner at regional
council meetings. See id. at 53.
92. Id. at 60.
93. See Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions: National Standard 2-Scientific Information, 74
Fed. Reg. 65,724, 65,725 (Dec. I1, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600).
94. Id. at 65,725-27.
95. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
96. Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1540 (2007).
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Paul Stevens in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc.97 The court's first task is to determine "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." 98 If it has, then the analysis is over: if
the agency has promulgated a regulation based on a statutory interpretation that
contrary to Congress's intent, the court will strike the regulation.99  If,
however, Congress was "silent" on the issue, then "the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute."t00 In this case, a court will uphold the agency action unless it finds
sufficient evidence that the agency's interpretation of the statute was
unreasonable. 101
2. Council Determinations
Since the inception of the Magnuson-Stevens Act in 1976, fishermen and
NMFS have quarreled over the best way to manage fisheries.102 These quarrels
have often resulted in challenges to National Standard 2.103 These challenges
have come from environmental organizations, fishing organizations, and
coastal states representing their residents. 104
a. Lawmakers Take Issue with NMFS's Treatment of Best Available
Science and Callfor an Internal Investigation of Council
Determinations
The debate over the best available science standard takes place not only in
the courts, but also between lawmakers and NMFS. os On August 28, 2008,
Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME) sent a letter, cosigned by Senators Susan
M. Collins (R-ME), Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), and John Kerry (D-MA), to
97. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; see Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV.
187, 188, 190-91 (2006).
98. Chevron, at 842.
99. Id. at 842-43.
100. Id. at 843.
101. Id. at 843 n.11 (citing Fed. Elections Comm'n v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 39 (1981); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450 (1978)).
102. See, e.g., WEBER, supra note 11, at 154-55. As one commentator has noted,
[B]y ignoring the possibility that fishermen might have some well-founded ideas of
their own about the health and the size of the stocks and giving NMFS the sole,
unassisted job of assessing the fish populations and of advising the councils on how to
achieve desirable catch levels, [the Magnuson-Stevens Act's] council system placed
NMFS in an unavoidably adversarial position that produced increasingly defensive
science.
DOBBS, supra note 9, at 91; see generally CAREY, supra note 28, at 55-74 (discussing the
interaction between the regional councils and the regulated fishermen); PLAYFAIR, supra note 9,
at 43-89 (describing how Gloucester fishermen have attempted to adjust to the regulations).
103. Eagle, supra note 9, at 287.
104. See Or. Trollers Ass'n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104, 1108, 1117 (9th Cir. 2006); Nw.
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Gordon, 849 F.2d 1241, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1988).
105. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
490 [Vol. 60:475
2011] New Standards for the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation Act 491
Department of Commerce Inspector General Todd Zinser requesting a review
of NMFS's compliance with National Standard 2.106 The Senators were
concerned that fishery management plans did not allow the New England
groundfishery to take the maximum sustainable yield due to inaccurate stock
assessments and exceedingly hiph biomass targets set by NMFS, a seeming
violation of National Standard 1. 07
In response, the Office of the Inspector General investigated Senator
Snowe's allegations that NMFS was not using the best available science. In
the Inspector General's view, although NMFS generally met the requirements
of National Standard 2, the lack of trust between the agency and the fishermen,
based on a lack of communication and understanding, was more alarming.109
The Inspector General "found generally that the northeast region's
groundfish industry lacks confidence in the fishery management process."" 0
Although the investigation uncovered that "[s]ome interviewees impugned the
science," most interviewees "impugned the management decisions made with
106. Letter from Todd J. Zinser, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Senator Susan
M. Collins (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/in
progress reviewsofcommerceactivities/Notification%20to%20NMFSNortheast%20Fisheries
%20Science%2OCenter.pdf (acknowledging the Senator's letter and apprising the Senator of the
issues that the Office of the Inspector General intended to investigate); Letter from Todd J.
Zinser, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (Oct. 2, 2008),
available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/inprogress reviews of commerce activities/
Notification%20to%20NMFS Northeast%2OFisheries%2OScience%20Center.pdf (same); Letter
from Todd J. Zinser, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Senator John F. Kerry (Oct. 2,
2008), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/inprogress reviews-ofcommerce_
activities/Notification%20to%20NMFS Northeast%2OFisheries%2OScience%20Center.pdf
(same); Letter from Todd J. Zinser, Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Senator
Olympia J. Snowe (Oct. 2, 2008), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/
inprogress reviews of commerce activities/Notification%20to%20NMFSNortheast%20Fisheri
es%20Science%20Center.pdf (same).
107. See Press Release, Senator Olympia J. Snowe, Snowe Calls for Investigation of
Northeast Fisheries Science Center to Verify NMFC Fish Stock Data Accuracy (Aug. 28, 2008),
available at http://snowe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressRoom.PressReleases&
ContentRecordid=0afe8402-802a-23ad-47b8-8c I e9bdb220c&Region id=&Issueid=d6938819-
e35b-b44f-421f-729717308f35; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1802(38) (2006) (defining optimum yield as
maximum sustainable yield); id. § 1851(a)(1) (requiring fishery management plans to allow for
the optimum yield).
108. Letter from Todd J. Zinser, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep't of Commerce, to Senator
Olympia J. Snowe, at 1 (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/
correspondence/2009.02.26_1G to Snowe.pdf.
109. Id. at 2 ("Although we found merit with several of the specific allegations [laid out by
Senator Snowe's letter], . . . we identified several issues with respect to the relationship between
NOAA in the Northeast region and the groundfish industry . . . that NOAA should promptly
address."); see also Richard Gaines, Inspector: 'Trust' Gap Hurts, But Science Good,
GLOUCESTER TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, available at http://www.gloucestertimes.com/fishing/x6453
20932/Inspector-Trust-gap-hurts-but-science-good.
I 10. Letter from Todd J. Zinser to Senator Olympia Snowe, supra note 108, at 9.
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the science.""' The Inspector General believed that this was caused by a long
history of distrust and fighting between NMFS and the New England fisheries,
particularly, the arguments with the groundfishing industry. 112
Although the Inspector General found that NMFS was generally operating in
compliance with National Standard 2, there were instances when questions
pertaining to the quality and accuracy of the science were legitimate, and
NMFS's responses to the questions were troublesome." 3  The Inspector
General also found that three of the Senators' objections had merit.114
Specifically, the Inspector General found validity in the objections to NMFS's
handling of yellowtail flounder and haddock management." The
investigation made clear that NMFS must "more aggressively pursue
ecosystem approaches to fisheries management."116
b. Trawlgate
There are other more egregious examples of questionable NMFS scientific
data. In 2002, NMFS revealed that for the previous two years, R/V Albatross
IV, the vessel responsible for collecting the majority of data upon which
northeast groundfishing regulations were based, had fished its nets
improperly. 1 The research vessel, manned not by experienced fishermen, but
rather by researchers with little knowledge of commercial fishing practices,
incorrectly laid the length of wire between the vessel and doors of the net,
known as warps.' 18 During the two-year period, the warps were not measured
111. Id
112. Id ("[Distrust] is based on a long history of sparring between the groundfish industry
and NOAA regulators over limits to the amount of days that fishing vessels can spend at sea,
regulating certain types of gear, or closing some traditional fishing grounds to fishing.").
113. Id at 2 (finding "merit with several of the specific allegations" questioning the quality
of science used by NMFS, but determining that generally, the NMFS Science Center acted in
compliance with National Standard 2).
114. Id at 9, 14, 19.
115. Id at 19.
116. Id Ecosystem impact studies provide an all-inclusive evaluation of single and multi-
species and take into account environmental factors to better evaluate future fish stock tendencies.
Id.
117. Daley, supra note 11.
118. Dexter Van Zile, Trawlgate Skeptics Redeemed, NAT'L FISHERMAN, Apr. 2003, at 24.
For many years,
fishermen in New England have complained about the stock survey data compiled by
the National Marine Fisheries Service. Fishermen who harvested groundfish stocks in
the region routinely criticized NMFS scientists for under-counting the number of fish in
the region's waters. ...
Scientists, regulators and environmentalists dismissed these complaints as self-
serving attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the harvest restrictions forcing them
off the water....
Then in September, NOAA Fisheries made an astounding admission: The trawl lines
on the Albatross IV were mismarked, and depending how far the lines were released,
could be uneven by as much as 5 and 1/2 feet. Scientists were quick to point out they
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to ensure that the two lengths of lines were equal, which led to one of the
towlines being up to six feet longer than the other.' 19 This effectively led to
the net being towed sideways, drastically reducing its catch efficiency.120
Thus, the data collected from the tows likely reflected far fewer fish than it
should have.121 This mishap served only to fuel fishermen's distrust of
NMFS's ability to regulate fairly and effectively.122
c. The Battle in the Courts: Challenging National Standard 2
Section 1855(f) 1 ives courts the power to hear challenges to fishery
management plans. The statute provides judicial review for an action that is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with law, if it is unconstitutional, if the agency exceeded its statutory authority,
or if the agency failed to comply with all procedural requirements.12
had no idea what impact, if any, the uneven trawl lines had on the survey data, but for
fishermen in the region, the admission demonstrated that something was definitely
wrong with the trawl data.
Id.
119. PLAYFAIR, supra note 9, at 235. Although there can be variations from one net to
another, generally, a net used for groundfishing consists of a long conical net the narrowest part
being the end (cod-end or bag) of the net and the widest part the front or "mouth." See
FishWatch-US. Seafood Facts, NOAA, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/fishwatch/fishinggears.htm
(last visited Jan. 6, 2011). Attached along the bottom of the mouth is a length of chain, sewn all
along the bottom, that serves three purposes: (1) it helps the net sink to the bottom as it is set
back, (2) it keeps the bottom of the net firmly on the ocean floor as the tow occurs, and (3) if tied
correctly, it will kick up the bottom in order to herd the fish in front of the net. Along the top of
the mouth are a number of small buoys that serve to keep the mouth as vertically open as
possible. Leading from the mouth are four equal lengths of line, two on each side (one high, one
low) that attach to two "doors," large wooden panels with lead slates on the bottom. The top and
bottom lines from each side are each tied to their respective side doors that, when pulled, force
the net to open horizontally. Equal lengths of wire are attached to the front of the each door and
lead up to the boat.
120. Van Zile, supra note 118, at 25.
121. Id at 24-25.
122. Id As one commentator observed,
These days, NMFS' [sic] ability (or lack thereof) to accurately assess fish stocks has
become a punch line. When describing the abundance of scup in the region after an
astounding recovery, Jim Lovgren, a member of the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management
Council and one of the fishermen who participated on the observation cruise, said,
"They're so abundant even the Albatross IV can catch them."
Id. at 25.
123. 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f)(1) (2006) ("Regulations promulgated by the Secretary under this
[Act] and actions described in paragraph (2) shall be subject to judicial review to the extent
authorized by, and in accordance with, chapter 7 of title 5 . . . ."); id. § 1855(f)(2) ("The actions
referred to in paragraph (1) are actions that are taken by the Secretary under regulations which
implement a fishery management plan, including but not limited to actions that establish the date
of closure ofa fishery to commercial or recreational fishing.").
124. Id § 1855(f)(1)(b) (referencing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (2006)).
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When challenging a fishery management plan, it is common for plaintiffs to
challenge the regulation as violating National Standard 2 by arguing that the
plan is not based on the best available science.' 2 5  Courts are particularly
reluctant, however, to overturn an agency determination when the decision
involves scientific or highly technical research.126 As a result, courts have
granted great deference to NMFS in its determinations of what is the best
available science.1 27 In general, courts have accepted a best available science
argument only when the agency bases its decision entirely on something other
than science. 128
A 2002 Ninth Circuit case illustrates this scientific deficit. In Midwater
Trawlers Cooperative v. Department of Commerce, the Ninth Circuit observed
that "the best available politics does not equate to the best available science"
and struck a fishery management plan that allocated a certain percentage of
whiting quota to American Indian tribes that had traditionally fished for
whiting. The court reasoned that, although it was proper for NMFS to
allocate a particular percentage of the quota to the tribes, the negotiated
allocation "was a product of pure political compromise, not reasoned scientific
endeavor."l 30
On the other hand, courts have held that National Standard 2 does not
require NMFS or the regional councils to conduct additional research when
creating fishery management plans.131 In Massachusetts v. Daley, for instance,
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts challenged a rule promulgated by NMFS
that amended the method used for allocating the total quota for summer scup
fishing among the states.132 The Commonwealth claimed that "the regulatory
amendment [was] 'arbitrary, capricious, [and] an abuse of discretion,' in that it
[was] based upon unreliable and outdated data."' 33
125. COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note at 66, at 1.
126. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1541 (2007).
127. See Massachusetts v. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74, 76-77 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd, 170 F.3d
23 (1st Cir. 1999).
128. See Midwater Trawlers Coop. v. Dep't of Commerce, 282 F.3d 710, 720 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. Id. at 719-21; see Fund for Animals v. Williams, 246 F. Supp. 2d 27, 41 (D.D.C. 2003)
(rejecting an argument made by the challenger that a rule made under the Endangered Species Act
was void due to its emergence from political negotiations (citing Midwater Trawlers, 282 F.3d at
720)).
130. Midwater Trawlers, 282 F.3d at 720. The court stated that the allocation may well have
been fair, but the clear language of National Standard 2 "require[d] that it be founded on science
and law, not pure diplomacy." Id. at 720-21; see Ecology Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 451 F.3d
1183, 1194 n.4 (10th Cir. 2006) (discussing the difficulty that courts have had when applying the
best available science standard in a variety of environmental protection statutes).
131. See Recreational Fishing Alliance v. Evans, 172 F. Supp. 2d 35, 44 (D.D.C. 2001) ("An
agency is required only to base its determinations on information available at the time
of. . . implementing the regulations."); see also Blue Water Fishermen's Ass'n v. Nat'l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 226 F. Supp. 2d 330, 337 (D. Mass. 2002).
132. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 75.
133. Id. (second alteration in original).
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The court started its analysis by applying the arbitrary and capricious
standard. 134 It then stated that, when conducting a review of a "regulation
promulgated pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act . . . , a court must be
particularly cognizant of the ten national standards contained in the Act.", 35
The court observed that the "premise underlying Massachusetts' first argument
is that NMFS had an 'affirmative obligation' [under National Standard 2] to
collect landing data for scup caught in 'inshore' waters before setting state-by-
state quotas." 36 Ultimately, the court disagreed with the Commonwealth's
argument and rejected its definition of best available science, which
encompassed an affirmative duty to research.137
The court did not believe that National Standard 2 should be interpreted so
narrowly.' 38  It noted that the Magnuson-Stevens Act does not define the
phrase,l 9 and observed that, barring "express statutory language imposing an
affirmative duty on an agency, courts have been reluctant to impose one." 40
There was no affirmative language in the regulation that sought to interpret
National Standard 2.141 The court also concluded that the language in the
statute "impl[ied that it does not mandate any affirmative obligation on the
agency's part."' Finally, the court pointed to precedent that allows the
agency to act "before the information on which [it] intends to rely is even
'complete."' 1 43 From this, the court concluded that the term "best scientific
information available" does not im ose a duty on NMFS to conduct any
research when promulgating its rules.?44
Finally, a recent case that gained notoriety in the fishing industry is
Massachusetts v. Gutierrez, in which the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
the State of New Hampshire sued NMFS, challenging an emergency rule titled
Framework 42.145 The rule, enacted after a determination that two of the seven
134. Id. at 76.
135. Id.




140. Id (citing Dubois v. Thomas, 820 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1987)).
141. Id at 77 n.3 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 600.315(b)(l)-(2)).
142. Id at 77 (citing Wash. Crab Producers v. Mosbacher, 924 F.2d 1438, 1444 (9th Cir.
1991)).
143. Id (citing Nat'l Fisheries Inst. v. Mosbacher, 732 F. Supp. 210, 225 (D.D.C. 1990)).
144. Id. Although the Court rejected the National Standard 2 argument made by the
Commonwealth, it struck the allocation because it determined that the Secretary knew that the
data was flawed when he relied on it, which made the Secretary's actions arbitrary and capricious.
Id. at 78.
145. Massachusetts v. Gutierrez, 594 F. Supp. 2d 127, 129 (D. Mass. 2009); see Fisheries:
Federal Judge Temporarily Suspends Framework 42 but Judgment Isn't a Total Win for Fisheries
or a Total Loss for Fisheries Regulators, CONSERVATION REPORT (Feb. 20, 2009),
http://conservationreport.com/2009/02/20/fisheries-federal-judge-temporarily-suspends-
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fisheries regulated under the New England "multi-species" permit would be
overfished, reduced the "days at sea" that permit holders could fishl46 in
sensitive fishing areas. 147 The claimants argued that the brand of science that
NMFS used to promulgate Framework 42 was not the best scientific
information available.148 The court again noted that when reviewing an agency
action, "courts afford agencies great deference,"l 49 and that deference is only
heightened in cases in which the rulemaking requires special scientific
expertise. 50
Reviewing the statute, the court found that deference had "found its way into
the language" of National Standard 2 through the word "available," and
therefore the choice of science was more "a matter of judgment" than "a matter
of absolutes."151  The court continued: "Best Science has been interpreted so
broadly as to allow Commerce to use incomplete information as the basis for a
regulation."l52 It concluded that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie
case because they failed to provide an alternative form of science.153
Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to NMFS. 154
framework-42-but-judgment-isn%E2%80%99t-a-total-win-for-fishers-or-a-total-loss-for-
fisheries-regulators/.
146. Gutierrez, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 130. Until recently, those fishermen working under a
multi-species permit were limited to a certain number of days at sea, allotted to each fisherman on
the basis of data recorded by the fisherman regarding how many days he used his license. See
John B. Walden, Modeling the Impact of Days at Sea Leasing in the Northeast Multispecies
Fishery, NOAA-FISHERIES, http://www.st.nmfs.noaa.gov/st5/documents/Modeling the
impact of daysat sea leasing in the Northeast multispeciesfishery.pdf. The more he used
the license, the more days he would be given. Days at sea denotes the days that one is allowed to
fish under the permit. Id. This system arguably violated another national standard that required
the fishery management plans to take into account the safety of the fishermen. See 16 U.S.C. §
1851(a)(10) (2006). The days at sea system could force fishermen to stay out in unsafe
conditions or lose their day to fish.
147. Gutierrez, 594 F. Supp. 2d at 130.
148. Id at 131.
149. Id (citing Assoc. Fisheries of Me., Inc. v. Daley, 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997)).
150. Id (citing Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103
(1983)).
151. Id at 131-32.
152. Id at 132 (citing Massachusetts v. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd,
170 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1999)).
153. Id.
154. Id ("[A]ny party objecting to Commerce's science as the Best Science must introduce
'better' science. A party cannot expect relief without providing science to counter what
Commerce identifies as Best Science." (citing Or. Trollers Ass'n v. Gutierrez, 452 F.3d 1104,
1120 (9th Cir. 2006); Massachusetts v. Daley, 170 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 1999)).
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II. NMFS AND THE COURTS HAVE INCORRECTLY DEFINED "NATIONAL
STANDARD 2" AS NOT INCLUDING A MANDATE TO ACHIEVE THE BEST
AVAILABLE SCIENCE
Courts currently interpret National Standard 2 narrowly, allowing a
challenge to continue only if the plaintiff can offer alternative science to show
that NMFS's reliance on its science was arbitrary or capricious.' 55 This not
only economically limits those who can bring a claim under the provisionl56
because it requires additional scientific studies, but it also does not take into
account when NMFS does not employ the best available scientific data
collection methods for fishery plan creation. This is due mainly to the
approach exemplified in Massachusetts v. Daley, which found no explicit
affirmative duty to research in National Standard 2. Courts are reluctant to
impose an affirmative duty on an agency absent an explicit directive by
Congress. 159 In this case, however, the courts have granted NMFS the ability
to promulgate rules with little credible scientific basis, even when credible
science was reasonably obtainable had NMFS done the proper research.160
This is an absurd result and contradicts Congress's intent when it enacted the
Magnuson-Stevens Act.161
A. Definition of "Available" Allows for an Affirmative Duty to Research
When examining the definition of "available," Congress's intent becomes
even more apparent. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary includes
multiple definitions of the term, including "present or ready for immediate
use," "accessible," and "obtainable."1 62 If the proper meaning of "available" in
16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(2) is "present or ready for immediate use," then National
Standard 2, as courts currently hold, would not require the regional councils to
obtain additional scientific research in the process of creating fishery
management plans.163  However, if the proper meaning is "accessible" or
"obtainable," it is reasonable to foresee instances when the statute would
require NMFS and the regional science centers to gather obtainable science if
155. Id. (citing Or. Trollers Ass'n, 452 F.3d at 1120; Daley, 170 F.3d at 30).
156. See OCEAN STUDIES BOARD, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, IMPROVING THE
COLLECTION, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF MARINE FISHERIES DATA 59-60 (2000) (discussing
the costs associated with fisheries studies).
I57. See supra Part I.C.
158. Massachusetts v. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D. Mass. 1998), aff'd, 170 F.3d 23 (1st
Cir. 1999).
159. Id.
160. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
161. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(3) (2006) (stating that one of the purposes of the Magnuson-
Stevens Act is "to assure that the national fishery conservation and management program utilizes,
and is based upon, the best scientific information available").
162. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 79 (10th ed. 1997).
163. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
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it would yield more accurate results and lead to more effective fishery
management plans.
B. Statutory Construction Supports an Affirmative Duty to Research
The Ma nuson-Stevens Act, as a whole, suggests that NMFS has a duty to
research.1  National Standard 1 mandates that "[c]onservation and
management measures shall prevent overfishing while achieving, on a
continuing basis, the optimum yield from each fishery for the United States
fishing industry."l 6 5 This charges the regional councils to create plans that will
produce the "maximum sustainable yield."1 66  In order to determine the
"maximum sustainable yield" on a continuing basis, exact scientific data on the
various populations in a fish stock is required. If the population estimate is too
high, the fishery management plan will allow for overfishing of the species and
will allow for a catch that is greater than the "maximum sustainable yield."1 67
Conversely, if the population estimate is too low, then the plan will allow
fishermen to catch too few fish and lead to a catch that is less than the
"maximum sustainable yield."1 68 Due to the inherent difficulties in developing
a maximum sustainable yield estimate, it is counterintuitive that Congress
would, in National Standard 2, undermine National Standard I by allowing
NMFS Science Centers to avoid doing the requisite research to determine
"maximum sustainable yield."
Additionally, in 16 U.S.C. § 1801, Congress laid out the scope and purpose
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act.169 Section 1801(a)(2) states:
Certain stocks of fish have declined to the point where their
survival is threatened, and other stocks of fish have been so
substantially reduced in number that they could become similarly
threatened as a consequence of (A) increased fishing pressure, (B)
the inadequacy of fishery resource conservation and management
practices and controls, or (C) direct and indirect habitat losses which
have resulted in a diminished capacity to support existing fishing
levels. 170
Section 1801(a)(3) continues:
164. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(8) ("The collection of reliable data is essential to the effective
conservation, management, and scientific understanding of the fishery resources of the United
States."); id. § 1851(a)(8) (requiring "measures [to be] consistent with the conservation
requirements of this [Act]").
165. Id § 1851(a)(1).
166. Id. § 1802(33) (indicating that this level shall be reduced by "any relevant social,
economic, or ecological factor"); id. § 1851(a)(1) (setting forth the optimum yield goal for fishery
conservation and management).
167. Id. § 1802(33)-(34).
168. See id. § 1802(33).
169. Id § 1801.
170. Id. § 1801(a)(2).
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Commercial and recreational fishing constitutes a major source of
employment and contributes significantly to the economy of the
Nation. Many coastal areas are dependent upon fishing and related
activities, and their economies have been badly damaged by the
overfishing of fishery resources at an ever-increasing rate over the
past decade.171
Because the fisheries are integral to the nation's economy,172 it would be
surprising for Congress not to require NMFS to obtain scientific data that is
reasonably available.
C. Legislative History Suggests an Affirmative Duty to Research
Congress clearly envisioned that it would be necessary for NMFS to conduct
additional research to satisfy National Standard 2.173 The use of the term "best
scientific information available" was Congress's acknowledgement of the
inherent uncertainty in natural scientific research.174 If Congress had instead
mandated a standard such as "best science" or "best possible science," this
inherent uncertainty would have inhibited NMFS from enacting any
regulations because it would have lacked the proper discretion to determine the
most appropriate science to use.175  This does not mean, however, that
Congress envisioned a regime in which NMFS had unfettered discretion in the
type of science used, nor did Congress intend to give NMFS carte blanche to
conduct research in haphazard or inferior ways. 7 6 Blind judicial acquiescence
to the agency's scientific determinations has given NMFS greater power than
Congress originally envisioned. 177
D. Best Available Science Requires NMFS to Obtain Science
Although judicial precedent suggests otherwise, National Standard 2's
ordinary meaning and legislative history combined with the scope and context
of the Magnuson-Stevens Act indicates that Congress expected NMFS to try to
develop the best available science in anticipation of a fishery management
plan. This standard was not intended to relieve NMFS of its duty to research
and disclose.179 Congress intended for the standard to serve in two capacities:
(1) to allow NMFS to regulate swiftly, with less-than-perfect science,
overfished fisheries; and (2) to require NMFS to improve continually the
171. Id. § 1801(a)(3).
172. See id. § 1801(a).
173. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
174. See COMM. ON BEST SCIENCE, supra note 66 (discussing congressional sensitivity to the
timely availability of updated fish populations).
175. See supra Part II.A-B.
176. See supra Part II.A-B.
177. See supra Part I.C.2.c.
178. See supra Part II.A-B.
179. See supra Part [l.A-B.
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science for the inevitable adjustments to fishery management plans. By
refusing to hear claims that NMFS had failed to conduct proper research before
promulgating a regulation, even with a deferential standard, the courts have
frustrated the congressional intent underlying the Magnuson-Stevens Act.
III. SAFEGUARDING NATIONAL STANDARD 2: PROTECTING THE BEST
AVAILABLE SCIENCE
NMFS is taking significant steps to improve the interpretation and
application of National Standard 2 by proposing to accept a number of the
2004 Committee on Best Science recommendations. so If NMIFS makes a
concerted effort to increase transparency, and the peer review system succeeds,
the process of developing fishery management plans will improve. Even so,
issues remain with National Standard 2, namely the overly restrictive judicial
interpretation.
A. Courts Should Alter Their Interpretations oflNational Standard 2
The simplest way to resolve interpretation issues is for courts to recognize
that the current interpretation of "best available science" is unworkable and
frustrates the congressional intent underlying the Magnuson-Stevens Act.' 81
Courts should interpret the term "available" as "accessible" or "obtainable"
and should recognize NMFS's duty to collect and improve research when the
current research is not the "best available."1 82 Courts would still defer to
NMFS's "best available science" determination, but they would also determine
whether NMFS acted arbitrarily in collecting data.'83 Currently, only NMFS's
results are scrutinized, and only when an alternative study is offered.184
Changing the definition in this way would not undermine the agency's power;
rather, it would serve as a safeguard against tailored data collection and agency
capture.185
B. The Trouble with a Legislative Solution
Some commentators have called for greater congressional involvement in
the science-gathering process in an approach called the command-and-conquer
180. See Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions: National Standard 2-Scientific Information, 74
Fed. Reg. 65,724 (Dec. I1, 2009) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 600); see also supra Part I.B.
181. See supra Part II.A-C.
182. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 162, at 79.
183. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
184. See supra Part I.C.2.
185. See 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(1) (2006) (requiring fishery management plans to allow for
optimum yield); Massachusetts v. Daley, 10 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77-78 (D. Mass. 1998) (discussing a
situation in which NMFS relied on what it knew to be flawed data when creating regulations),
aff'd, 170 F.3d 23 (1st Cir. 1999).
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method.186 This method calls for Congress to employ a more definitive data-
collection requirement. 87 It suggests that a scientific mandate like the one
used in the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA),"'
which allows Congress to "make policy choices for itself," is essential to
maintaining scientific integrity.' 89  Specifically, this method argues for two
modifications to the science requirement in the Magnuson-Stevens Act: (1)
"Congress needs to direct agencies to conduct additional scientific studies
where the best science available is insufficient or ambiguous, or where the
agency's methodology is problematic";' 90 and (2) if "the agency is unable to
make a purely scientific decision or regulation" due to "both biological and
economic factors . . . be[ing] considered,. . . Congress should provide agencies
with clear policy guidelines directing agencies to which side the agencies
should favor." 91
Although initially the command-and-conquer method seems appealing,
further inspection reveals serious problems with this solution. First, a stronger
mandate for science could seriously impair the ability for NMFS to regulate at
all.192 The IDCPA was derived from the Marine Mammal Protection Act and
the International Dolphin Conservation Program.193 The Act's chief purpose
was to reduce "dolphin mortality rates associated with purse seine fishing in
the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean." 9 4 Congress passed the IDCPA in 1997 to
comply with the International Dolphin Conservation Program. 195
Concerned that purse seining "had significant, psychological stress effects"
on dolphin populations that would impede recovery,' 96 Congress restricted the
practice and charged NMFS to investigate whether seining had an adverse
effect on dolphin stocks.19 7  The Act specifically charged NMFS, in
consultation with other bodies, to conduct a study that would analyze the
effects of purse seining on dolphin populations. 98 Congress's instructions to
NMFS were "exceptionally specific" and required particular studies to be
186. See Mariyetta Meyers, Comment, Maximizing Scientific Integrity in Environmental
Regulations: The Need For Congress to Provide Guidance When Scientific Methods are
Inadequate or When Data Is Inconclusive, 12 ANIMAL L. 99, 105-06 (2005).
187. Id.
188. International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-42, 111 Stat. 1122
(1997) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418).
189. Meyers, supra note 186, at 103-06.
190. Id at 105.
191. Id at 105-06.
192. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
193. Meyers, supra note 186, at 116-17.
194. Id at 117 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1411 (2006)).
195. Id (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1411).
196. Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brower v. Daley, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1075 (N.C. Cal.
2000), aff'd, Brower v. Evans, 257 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
197. Id. at 117-18 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1414a(a)).
198. 16 U.S.C. § 1414a.
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completed, such as abundance surveys and stress studies with specific start and
end dates. 199 These specific instructions effectively enabled NOAA to study
the effects of purse seining on dolphins and provided the courts with more
objective guidelines to review agency decisions. 20 0  Congress could have
provided specificity in this statute because it addressed a particular issue in an
isolated geographic location, the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean.201
The Magnuson-Stevens Act, by contrast, governs all fisheries between three
and two hundred miles off all U.S. coastlines. 2 02  The intricate system of
regional councils and science centers created by Congress to manage this
203
system reflects the complexity of the task. As NMFS pointed out in its
notice of proposed rulemaking, "[t]he availability of scientific information to
inform fisheries management varies. Ecosystems and human societies are
complex, interacting, dynamic systems that are impacted by multiple factors,
including those within the scope of fisheries management. "2 After reviewing
the numerous comments received, NMFS concluded that National Standard 2
guidelines "should not prescribe a static definition of [best available science]
because of the dynamic developments inherent in making improvements in
scientific information for fishery management." 205 It is untenable for Congress
to make policy decisions about specific scientific data collection methods for
each fishery regulated under the Magnuson-Stevens Act on a regular basis.
Congress already made a policy decision: fishery management plans should be
based on the "best scientific information available" as determined by the
experts employed by NMFS for that purpose.206 When interested parties
believe that NMFS is not fulfilling this mandate, they have the right to sue
207
under the statute and challenge the agency determination.20 A change in the
interpretation of "best scientific information available" would strengthen this
ability to challenge while also ensuring that the agency maintains its necessary
208discretion.
199. Meyers, supra note 186, at 118 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1385(g), 1414a(a)(3)(A)-(C)).
200. Id. at 127-29.
201. See The Tuna-Dolphin Issue, Sw. FISHERIES SCI. CTR., http://swfsc.noaa.gov/
textblock.aspx?Division=PRD&ParentMenulD=228&id=1408 (last visited Jan. 6, 2011).
202. 16 U.S.C.§ 1811.
203. See id § 1852 (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions: National
Standard 2-Scientific Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 65,724 (Dec. 11, 2009) (to be codified at 50
C.F.R. pt. 600).
204. Magnuson-Stevens Act Provisions: National Standard 2-Scientific information, 74
Fed. Reg. 65,725.
205. Id.
206. See supra Part part L.A-B.
207. See 16 U.S.C. § 1855(f); Meyers, supra note 186, at 106-07.
208. See supra Part IllA; see also Meyers, supra note 186, at 127.
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C. Threading the Needle: A Legislative Solution Nevertheless
Although a static definition employed by the legislature or through
regulation would be misguided, a slight change in the statutory language could
clarify the duty to obtain scientific data under National Standard 2: simply
replace "best scientific information available" with "best reasonably obtainable
scientific information." This amendment would require NMFS to seek out
scientific information that could be obtained during the fishery management
plan process, and, most importantly, it would allow litigants to challenge the
scientific data without having to produce alternate science. 209
IV. CONCLUSION
Currently, the best scientific information available standard employed by
NMFS and interpreted by the courts is broad and ambiguous. This ambiguity
has caused a breakdown in trust and collaboration between fishermen,
environmentalists, and NMFS. As a result, data collection has suffered and
management plans have not had their intended effects. Without changing the
current fisheries management process, fishing communities will not survive.
There will be no more "old men of the seas," and a storied tradition will be
lost. Unfortunately, the proposals in this Comment will not solve the
troublesome issue of fishery management. However, the promulgation of a
new National Standard 2 regulation that employs peer review and greater
transparency and makes scientific data more accessible to fishermen is
progress. The next step is to strengthen the interpretation of National Standard
2 by imposing a duty to research. When this is done, NMFS can begin to
reverse the "salao"210 luck for itself and the fishermen, and it can maintain the
current generation of fishing communities while ensuring a livelihood for
future generations of fishermen.
209. See Meyers, supra note 186, at 128-29 (explaining how a similar standard applies to the
IDCPA).
210. See HEMINGWAY, supra note 1.
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